In this paper, we study remotely controlled and observed multi-input controllable continuous linear systems, subject to periodic Denial-of-Service (DoS) jamming attacks. We first design a control and triggering strategy provenly capable of beating any partially known jammer via properly placing the closed-loop poles. Building on it, we then present an algorithm that is able to guarantee the system stability under unknown jamming attacks of this class. The functionality of this algorithm is also theoretically proven.
is to develop a method to counteract its effect.
The other natural framework to study systems security is Game Theory; to mention a few representative studies, [12, 24, 21] . In these studies, the security problem is formulated as a (dynamic) zerosum non-cooperative game. In [27] , the reinforcement learning technique is employed to beat a deceptive attacker. To the extent of modeling the jammer, the closest work to our studies stated in this paper are [12, 13] , nonetheless, the method exploited to guarantee the stability differs greatly in our paper since game theoretical framework is not deployed.
In this paper, we focus on Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks [26, 20] , where the attacker aims at dropping the transmitted data. In particular, we narrow our study down to the attacks caused by the so-called periodic, or Pulse-Width Modulated (PWM) jammers. This type of attack is motivated by the ease of implementation and energy constraints; e.g., see [8, 11] .
In particular, we address the problem of system resilience in the context of triggering control, i.e., control is updated if required. This is motivated by maintaining the intelligent and economic communications. The recent works [23, 17, 25] have inspired our research; the distinctive feature in our study is that communication is not always feasible. To cover the globe, [15] addresses the security problem and formulates it in the triggering framework, however, it differs in its attacker model, indeed, [15] considers a class of deceptive attack.
In brief, we first address the problem of partially known DoS attacks caused by PWM jammers on multi-input linear systems to be controlled by sporadic feedback. Then, built on the obtained results, we introduce joint identification and control strategy, JAMCOID, to deal with any unknown DoS jammer of the same class. With respect to our earlier works, [10, 9] , the contributions of this note are, (i) the proposal of a parameter-dependent resilient triggering and control strategy for multiinput controllable linear systems, and (ii) the design of JAMCOID algorithm to address unknown periodic DoS PWM jamming attacks. 
Problem Formulation
In this section, we state the main problems analyzed in the paper.
We consider a remote operator-plant setup, where the operator uses a control channel to send wirelessly the control command to an open-loop unstable plant, see Figure 1 . We assume that the plant has no specific intelligence and is only capable of updating the control based on the data it receives. We also assume that the operator knows the plant dynamics and is able to obtain measurements of its states at particular time-instants.
More precisely, consider the following closedloop dynamics:
where x ∈ R d is the state vector, u ∈ R m is the input, A, B and K are matrices of proper dimensions, and {t k } k≥1 is a triggering time-sequence. Here, we also assume that: (i) System (2.1a) is open-loop unstable, and, (ii) the pair (A, B) is controllable.
We consider an energy-constrained jammercausing jamming attack on the control and measurement communication channels-whose signal can be represented as follows: (2.2)
where T ∈ R >0 , and n ∈ N. The sequence T n off ∈ R >0 , T n off < T , defines the time-intervals [nT, nT + T n off ], when the jammer is sleeping and communication is possible. We further denote T n on ∈ R >0 , and, [T n on , (n + 1)T ] be the time-interval where the jammer is active, thus no data can be sent, and nor the system state can be measured. Accordingly, it holds that T n off + T n on = T , n ∈ N. In this way, the parameter T n off need not be time-invariant which recalls Pulse-Width Modulated (PWM) jamming. Finally, we denote by T cr off a uniform lower-bound for T n off , i.e., T cr off ≤ T n off , ∀n ∈ N, where also we denote T cr on
In this paper, we shall first assume the type of jammer and the period of jamming signal have been identified, accordingly, we study the system asymptotic stability. Then, we shall address a scenario where the jammer period is not known, we propose a way to tackle this situation. More precisely, we study the following problems:
Consider any energyconstrained jammer described by (2.2) with parameters T and T off . Knowing T and T cr off , design a control and triggering strategy of the form (2.1b) resilient to the action of this jammer.
[Problem 2]:
Consider any energyconstrained jammer described by (2.2), where also the jammer's and operator's clocks are initially asynchronous by some time, t j . Knowing T cr off , propose a method to guarantee the asymptotic stability of the system, despite lack of knowledge on T and asynchronicity, t j .
Background and Preliminary Results
In this section, we briefly discuss the specific canonical form of a multi-input system to be considered in this paper; it is needed to keep the analysis selfcontained and given the fact this form is not unique for this class of systems. The employed technique is inspired from [16, 2] , it comes with certain advantages useful in our later analyses. We perform here the explanations to the required extent.
The pair (A, B) in (2.1) is controllable iff the following matrix is full rank:
where, Γ ∈ R d×d.m . Thus, there exist at least dlinearly independent columns in Γ. The paper [2] describes how to extract these d columns. Accordingly, [2] derives certain numbers, p, and {r i } p i=1 , which define the static similarity transformation matrix, T s , to be applied on the system, where it also holds that
Applying this similarity transformation matrix, T s , in the following way:
transforms Dynamics (2.1) into:
whereÂ andB, shall be in a favorite form. In what follows, and with a slight abuse of notation, we denote A ≡Â, B ≡B, K ≡K, and x ≡x.
The transformed state-matrix is obtained as follows: The transformed input-matrix is given by:
The matrix B satisfies the following:
1. The arrays of B on its j−th column, for j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, are given as follows: We now introduce a particular choice of control gains to be applied on the transformed system. PROPOSITION 3.1. Consider System (3.3), let the control matrix K λ be as follows:
where the elements on its first three rows are chosen as in:
and, similarly, for the other arrays. Then, all the eigenvalues of the closed-loop matrix, A + BK λ , i.e., the closedloop system poles, are placed at −λ.
Proof. The proof relies on the exploitation of A + BK λ block diagonal structure, and that every i th block is in canonical form. We omit it here.
We characterize the algebraic and geometric multiplicities of the eigenvalue −λ in the next result. Beforehand, we also note that the unconventional arrangement of the arrays in matrices A and K λ is for the ease and consistency of presentation. Proof. It is easy to see that with this choice of K λ , det(sI − (A + BK λ )) = (s + λ) d follows. Thus, the algebraic multiplicity of −λ is d.
Note that the geometric multiplicity of −λ is equal to the kernel of A + BK λ + λI, given by [3] :
For simplicity, let us assume p = 2. Then, we get:
For this matrix, we note, (i) if ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , r 1 }, m k = 0, then there are r 2 −1 linearly independent columns in the first r 2 -columns, otherwise, there are r 2 , (ii) there are r 1 − 1 linearly independent columns in the second r 1 -columns of this matrix, and, (iii) the first r 1 -columns cannot influence the linear independence of the second r 2 -columns. Therefore, depending on the values of m k , there are either
Let q be as defined in the proposition statement, then, the last argument attributed for p = 2, can be also extended, where we conclude:
Now, plugging the latter equation into (3.4), yields:
which then implies the geometric multiplicity of −λ is q + 1. Moreover, by definition of q, it is at most p − 1 and at least 0, thus 1 ≤ 1 + q ≤ p. The proof is complete.
Jordan Decomposition and Triggering Strategy
In this section, we first present the Jordan decomposition of the closed-loop matrix of System (3.3) where K λ is chosen as in Proposition 3.1. Then, we shall introduce the triggering strategy which solves Problem 1.
According to Proposition 3.2, matrix A + BK λ has at most p linearly independent eigenvectors, where p ≤ m < d. Thus, this matrix is not diagonalizable, this fact motivates us to study its Jordan decomposition. Since the eigenvalues of A + BK λ are placed at −λ, we have:
where, J λ = −λI + N , and, T λ is a matrix built upon the linearly independent and generalized eigenvectors of A + BK λ . Note that, by Proposition 3.2, the geometric multiplicity of −λ is constant for all λ ∈ R >0 . Therefore, matrix N is unique for all values of λ ∈ R >0 . Moreover, since the arrays of A + BK λ are polynomial functions of λ, the eigenvectors of A + BK λ are rational functions of λ. Hence, T λ and T −1 λ also depend on λ in a rational way. These observations are useful in the stability analysis stated in next section.
Based on this Jordan decomposition technique, we introduce a family of coordinate transformations. Let us consider System (3.3a), with the control, u(t) = K λ x(t k ). Then, the closed-loop dynamics is:
where, e(t) = x(t k ) − x(t). Recalling (4.5), the transformations e(t) = T λ e λ (t), and, x(t) = T λ x λ (t) yield:
We state the following result as a first step in developing our triggering strategy. 
guarantees the asymptotic stability of this system, for σ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. The proof is omitted for space reasons. It follows along the lines of Proposition 4.1 in [9] .
Let t k and t k+1 be two consecutive time-instants given by event-triggering strategy (4.7). Then, for each λ, the following holds:
This is based on Theorem III.1, presented in [23] . In particular, [23] shows how to compute such τ λ . This implies the time-sequence generated by eventtriggering strategy (4.7) does not accumulate. Since in this paper we do not assume the operator can continuously measure the plant states, we adopt this τ λ as the basis of our triggering strategy. Proof. The proof can be found in Theorem 4.3 in [9] . At a sketch level, the main idea is to use τ λ ≤ t 2 − t 1 , where then letting t 1 = 0, and denoting t λ t 2 , we show lim λ→∞ t λ = 0, which then induces lim λ→∞ τ λ = 0. In this way, the uniqueness of matrix N -for all λ-in the Jordan decomposition technique, and, event-triggering condition (4.7) (at which t λ holds), play important roles.
In this paper, we assume the jammer is causing a "worst-case jamming scenario", i.e., T n off = T cr off , ∀n ∈ N. Now, using the parameter τ λ , we define our triggering strategy as follows.
DEFINITION 4.1. The triggering strategy used in this paper, despite presence of the jammer and to solve Problem 1, is defined as follows:
In this strategy, k ∈ N denotes the number of triggering time-instants occurring in the n th jammer period, and l ∈ N stands for the multiples of τ λ starting from l = 1 in the first period and adding up afterwards. We also note that based on Theorem 4.1, and for a given T , we can find a λ c so that the multiples of τ λ lie in the desired interval, i.e., the set introduced in (4.8) is never empty. At last, we also note that for a fixed n, the largest t * k,n is nT whereas t * 1,n+1 = nT + τ λ , thus these two time-instants do not coincide.
Stability Analysis of the Control and
Triggering Strategy Here, we present the main result on the control and triggering strategy which addresses Problem 1. Proof. The analysis is performed in an analogous way as in the proof of Theorem 5.1 in [9] , nonetheless for multi-input systems. At a sketch level, the main idea is to characterize the function C(λ) with the following property:
and, to further show:
whereby, the following can be inferred:
Therefore, by induction argument, we get the sequence {x(nT )} is a strictly decreasing sequence; hence, by a Lyapunov argument, the proof will be completed. On this way, the results explained in Section 4, namely, (i) the Jordan decomposition technique, wherein the uniqueness of matrix N for all values of λ is guaranteed, (ii) the rational dependency of T λ and T
−1
λ matrices on λ, (iii) the ISS Lyapunov function introduced in Proposition 4.1, and, (iv) the assertion of Theorem 4.1, are extremely helpful. Due to space limits, the details are omitted here.
Stabilization under unknown jamming signals
In this section, we propose a solution to Problem 2. It is built on the control and triggering strategy introduced in Section 4, along with the stability analysis presented in Section 5. First, we shall state our algorithm, and then we analyze the asymptotic stability of the system deploying it.
The JAMCOID Algorithm
To begin with, we note that the jammer's and operator's clocks need not be synchronized. Let t j ≥ 0 be this asynchronicity, i.e., the time difference between the jammer clock's initial time and the operator's. We then realize there are three unknown parameters, T cr on , T , and t j , which characterize the jamming signal, together with the known parameter, T cr off . Let u id : R ≥0 → {1} ∪ {null} be the signal which operator uses for jammer identification purposes, where u id (t) = 1 encodes that the operator sends message 1 to the plant, whereas, u id (t) = null declares no message is submitted. Let also u ste : R ≥0 → {null}∪R d be the rebound signal from the plant, such that u ste (t) ∈ R d is a successfully delivered message containing state information, while u ste (t) = null represents no message is delivered. Finally, let u ctrl : R d → {null} ∪ R m be the control submitted to the plant, where similar to the u id -case, u ctrl (t) = null induces that a control u ctrl (t) is computed and sent to the plant, whereas u ctrl (t) = null infers that no message is sent. In fact, we assume that the submission of u id , receipt of u ste , and submission of u ctrl happen in a sequential and instantaneous manner. That is, first a measurement is requested by sending u id , then upon its receipt, via u ste , a control is sent to the plant, via u ctrl . It is nonetheless worth noting that u ste (t) = null if and only if u ctrl (t) = null, i.e., we do not send any control if we do not receive any measurement, and this happens when the jammer is active at t.
Intuitively, the core idea behind JAMCOID is to intelligently plan the triggering time-sequence {t k } in order to (i) bound (not necessarily eliminate) asynchronicity, t j , (ii) find a valid useful interval to which T , or some multiple of this period, belongs. Our JAMCOID algorithm is formally described in the following lines, wherein the control, u ctrl (t k ), is computed as explained in Section 3, Proposition 3.1.
Step I: Set u id (t k ) = 1, according to t k = kM , where k ∈ N, for M = τ λ < T cr off 2 , and some τ λ as introduced in Section 4. Because T cr on is unknown, we can distinguish between two cases: Case (1): We do never hit the jammer's onsubperiod, that is, u ste (t k ) = null, ∀ t k . Thus, we keep updating the control at the prescribed times without interruption.
Case (2):
In this case, we hit the on-subperiod some time on the way. That is:
where, recalling the jamming signal, following holds: (6.10)
If this case occurs, we move on to Step II.
Step II: At time t = (k 1 + 1)M , the operator resets his clock as t ← t − k 1 M . Let us denote t 2 j = t 1 j + l 1 T − k 1 M , then by (6.10), we obtain:
Step III: Similar to Step I, we set u id (t k ) = 1 at t k = kM . Again, two cases are possible:
Case (1): Same as Case (1), in Step (1).
where, recalling the jamming signal, following holds: (6.12) ∃k 2 and l 2 such that k 2 M < t
If this case occurs, we move on to Step IV.
Step IV: At time t = (k 2 + 1)M , the operator resets his clock as t ← t − k 2 M . Further, let us also denote t 3 j = t 2 j + l 2 T − k 2 M , by (6.12), we get:
where, additionally:
Step V: Letl = ⌊ From (6.13), note that (k 2 +2)M is a valid upperbound for the unknown parameter t 3 j +l 2 T . Thus we estimate l 2 T by (k 2 + 2)M . We then keep updating the control at time-instants given by the following triggering strategy: (6.14)
In addition to communicating with the plant at the time-instants declared in (6.14), the operator sets u id (k 2 M ) = 1 and u id ((k 2 + 1)M ) = 1, and obtains u ste (k 2 M ), u ste ((k 2 + 1)M ); two cases may occur:
Thus, the operator does not detect an on-to-off transition of the jammer's signal from (l 2 − 1)T to l 2 T . It also means that the length of (l 2 − 1)T on-subperiod, is shorter than M . In this case, we reset M ← M δ , where δ ∈ (1, ∞) is a design parameter. We note that, by construction of τ λ , ∃λ, such that τ λ = M δ . Then, repeat from Step I.
Either u ste (k 2 M ) = null, or u ste ((k 2 + 1)M ) = null, or both. In other words, an onto-off transition of the jammer's signal happens from (l 2 − 1)T to l 2 T . This is characterized bȳ kM , where:
Reset k 2 ←k, t ← t −kM , and t 3 j ← t 3 j + l 2 T − kM , for which (6.13) also holds. Then, repeat from Step V.
The Stability of the JAMCOID Algorithm
Having stated the jammer identification and control algorithm in Subsection 6.1, we characterize its convergence properties in this subsection. It cannot be otherwise, since Case (2) in Step I;
Step II; Case (2) in Step III; and Step IV are intermediate computations. Moreover, Case (1) in Step V is out of sight, because repeating this case-with the same parameter δ-yields the triggering period, M δ n , where given T cr on constant, δ ∈ (1, ∞), and T cr on ≤ T on , then we deduce:
Therefore, in worst case, we shall repeat Case (1) in
Step V only n * < ∞ number of times. In order to prove asymptotic stability, we assess possible asymptotic behaviors. Under items 1 and 2, the jammer is not corrupting communication channels. Therefore, since the triggering time-sequence is chosen to be kτ λ , with k ∈ N, thus the asymptotic stability is maintained.
Item 3 leads to the iteration of Step V (through Case (2)). Stability will follow from the application of Theorem 5.1 for each iteration of this item via approximating T ≡ (k 2 + 2)M . This completes the proof. 
Simulations
In this section, we demonstrate the functionality of the aforementioned theoretical results on a representative academic example. We consider the following system: For the sake of brevity, we do not introduce the matrices A + BK λ , T λ , and N , here. The goal of the simulation is to verify Equation (5.9) stated in the proof sketch of Theorem 5.1. In order to do so, we run the C(λ)-Seeking Algorithm presented in [9] to obtain the sequence, {C(λ k )} 1000 k=1 , for {λ k = k} 1000 k=1 ; with set of parameters, σ = 0.001, T = 1 sec, T cr on = 0.7T , and T cr off = 0.3T . The result is presented in Figure 2 . Referring to this figure, we observe that lim λ→∞ C(λ) = 0 holds, i.e., (5.9) is verified.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this study, we have considered multi-input controllable continuous linear systems, under periodic PWM DoS jamming attacks. We first recalled a specific canonical form for this class of systems and introduced our control strategy. We then elaborated our triggering strategy, entailing the time-instants to update the control. We then proved this control and triggering strategy is able to beat the considered partially known jamming attacks. Consequently, we proposed JAMCOID algorithm, capable of beating considered unknown jamming attacks.
